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ARTICLES

WALTER L. ADAMSON, Marx’s Four Histories:
An Approach to His Intellectual Development
XX, Bei. 20, 379-402

Helmut Fleischer has distinguished three different approaches to history in the development of Marx’s thinking: the “anthropological” (in the 1844 Manuscripts), the “pragmatological” (in the Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology), and the “nomological” (in the Critique of Political Economy and Capital). However, these represent a less continuous and coherent development than Fleischer claims. The 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse can be instanced as a fourth view, more focused than the others on historiography, and at variance with what Marx says elsewhere. The sequence and overlapping of these four views call into question both the interpretation of Marx’s development as smoothly continuous and the interpretation of his development as “ruptured” into “early” and “late.”

ROBERT ANCHOR, History and Play: Johan Huizinga and His Critics
XVII, 63-93

Johan Huizinga, in Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (1938), was the first to attempt to define play and its role in culture, politics, and warfare. Play, he stated, is an activity which exists outside serious life routines, but which immerses the individual totally within its unique boundaries of time and space. The motivation for play is fun rather than material profit. Critics questioned how the higher forms of cultural experience could be at once playful and serious as Huizinga had claimed. Jacques Ehrmann and Eugen Fink concluded that play is not an Urphänomen distinct from reality. Rather, it is symbolic re-enactment of the world in which men can at once become the subjects and the objects of their activity. We can learn the meaning of existence for a particular society from its play.
Though customarily treated as a secondary theme, Lukács's preoccupation with the German legacy forms the architectonic center of his theory of culture. He studied in Berlin and Heidelberg from 1909-1915, and assimilated a direct line of German intellectual culture from Kant to Hegel to Marx. His transition to Marxism was blocked by his criticism of "vulgar" Marxism and by inability to reconcile the classical interpretation of German culture with his own reading of Marx. The rise of Hitler only confirmed his suspicion that the traditions of Kant and Hegel were radically opposed as reactionary and progressive. Lukács also opposed the romanticism of Kant and Schiller to the rationalism or realism of Hegel and Goethe. Finally, Lukács considered Mann his literary counterpart because of his approach to realism, modernism, and the re-interpretation of German culture.

STEPHEN BANN, Historical Text and Historical Object: The Poetics of the Musée de Cluny

An epistemological break occurred in historical discourse between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries; it is exemplified in the collections of Alexandre Lenoir and Alexandre du Sommerard in the Musée de Cluny. Foucault and later Hayden White identified this break as a transition from the classic to the romantic episteme. The classic eighteenth-century relationship between the historical object and the historical text tended to be reductionist and mechanistic while the nineteenth-century form was more integrated and organic. White treated these relations as modes of discourse and referred to their typological forms as tropes. He referred to the classic and romantic tropes as metonymy and synecdoche, respectively. Lenoir's "metonymic" collection includes as many objects of a period as possible within a space. Du Sommerard, on the other hand, displayed the objects "synecdochically" within a space designed not only to contain them, but to explain their role in the past.

F. M. BARNARD, Accounting for Actions: Causality and Teleology

Collingwood's faith in the historian's intuitive capacity for discerning the meaning of past actions by re-enactment is too unqualified. However, his thesis that through actions alone can reasons and inner meanings be discovered is true. This assumes that actions can be traced to recognizable agents and that these agents are able to
acknowledge their reasons. The relation between knowing and doing and between knowing and understanding is a form of causality not inconsistent with teleological reasoning. Characteristic of human action are the constitutive nature of causality, the delimiting effect of rationality on human autonomy, and the role of purpose as a mediating link between intention and outcome. Despite the fact that emphasis on impersonal actions and interactions seriously calls into question Collingwood's theory of understanding, any radical revision of this theory proves no less problematical.

F. M. BARNARD, Natural Growth and Purposive Development: Vico and Herder XVIII, 16-36

“Growth,” a term borrowed from biology, is often used to describe change in human history. The use of such terms, however, tends to obscure the fundamental differences between historical and natural causality. Vico and Herder were among the first to make a radical distinction between our understanding of events in nature and of those in human affairs. They argued that man can make conscious decisions which make his actions different from events in the non-human world. Yet, they also believed that human history has a purpose of its own, which man cannot alter. However, if human choice is to be truly free, then the outcome of human history cannot be entirely predetermined. Though Vico and Herder, like many other writers, attempted to merge these two notions, they failed to provide a satisfactory theory.

HOWARD R. BERNSTEIN, Marxist Historiography and the Methodology of Research Programs XX, Bei. 20, 424-449

Marxist historiography has always claimed to be “conceptually” rooted in the natural sciences and has therefore been concerned with the function of laws, the structure of theories, and the logical relations between hypotheses and empirical data. Minimal criteria for the identification of a scientific research program as developed by Lakatos and Laudan include: a negative heuristic; explanatory or predictable scientific theories; a central model or paradigm; identification and solution of internal problems; self-conscious awareness by researchers of a common tradition; and the internal dynamics of conflict and convergence. Less than a generation ago, Marxist scholarship seemed to offer the most innovative methodologies in history. More recently, however, Marxist scholarship seems to be reliving old glories while other approaches (psychohistory, quantitative history, and historical anthropology) have advanced more innovative research programs.
THOMAS BURGER, Droysen's Defense of Historiography:  
A Note  
XVI, 168-173

During the nineteenth century, positivists charged that since historical accounts did not uncover the laws involved in human behavior, they were devoid of significance and should be replaced by sociological studies. Theorists, including Droysen, responded that man has a dual nature. Man's biological self is the inalterable substance of his life, while his spiritual self enables him to create its form. The objects of this creation, social institutions, embody the ideas and ideals of a social order and are transformed when these values change. Remnants of the past are always contained within the new order and thus history both records the past and is embraced by the present. Since man is responsible for his progress he must know the past in order to fully understand and to act in the present. Droysen called this understanding of history Verstehen.

ALLAN R. BUSS, Critical Notice of Izenberg's  
"Psychohistory and Intellectual History"  
XVII, 94-98

Izenberg states that psychoanalysis should be used only for explaining irrational beliefs. This view of rationality, however, fails to acknowledge the content of rationality. The Frankfurt School of critical theory has argued that such substantive values as freedom and emancipation from domination may direct reason away from current social opinion. In addition, irrational thought may be masked by abstract, instrumental or technical rationality. This situation would be invisible if examined from Izenberg's ahistorical position. Izenberg also claims that irrational beliefs are independent of any logical process of deliberation. However, this prevents him from examining the truth or falsity of the content of a rational belief. His position supports both absolutist and relativist views which reinforce current ideas and reality. Izenberg offers no way of emancipating man from his present.

JOSEPH F. BYRNES, Suggestions on Writing the History of Psychological Data  
XVI, 297-305

Psychological theories can be used by historians to bring conceptual order to otherwise random psychological data. Unlike the psychologist, the historian is not required to adopt any single psychological theory, because the explanation of historical events does not depend upon the discovery of a general covering law. Historians, rather, use causal language to describe the linkages, both rational and non-rational, of particular sets of events. Though this form of historical
explanation, called the continuous-series approach, can provide a coherent conceptual theory of behavior, it cannot be considered a deductive proof. It is the historian's responsibility to judge both the empirical justification of a psychological theory and the appropriateness of its application to a particular historical context.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN, Toennies in America XVI, 147-167

The American reaction to Toennies's macrosociological approach was critical and often misunderstood in the first years of the twentieth century. Through the present, American sociology has been concerned primarily with the individual and the relationships of individuals as they are set within a social structure. Toennies, on the other hand, considered the corporation the fundamental unit of sociological studies. He argued that though the corporation is not, in fact, an independent self-activating entity like a person, it is so treated by human volition and in human action. The Toenniessian concepts are evident in the works of American sociologists including Ross, Loomis, Heberle, Sorokin, MacIver, and Wirth. Most importantly, his work influenced the two major schools of American sociology, the Parkians and the Parsonians.

DANIEL H. CALHOUN, Continual Vision and Cosmopolitan Orthodoxy XVIII, 257-286

Since the 1930s, social scientists have used and developed increasingly complex methods of quantitative explanation which have not necessarily made reference to similar developments in logical theory. The "Continuum Hypothesis" problem for logicians was whether higher orders of complexity were accessible to human intuition. Gödel argued in 1931 that systems of logic rest on assumptions which exist outside their axioms. For some this meant that complexity is beyond intuition. Others argued that intuitive visualization does not require necessary proof. Set theory and probability theory are constructs which enhance the visualization of infinity. The most recent development has been the notion of a non-CH model which states the conditions under which vision can "compute" a phenomenological universe. It is not a system of proof but a logical program for probabilistic research.

ERIC COCHRANE, The Transition from Renaissance to Baroque: The Case of Italian Historiography XIX, 21-38

The meaning of the term "baroque" has been the subject of much debate. In the field of historiography, historians have not engaged
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in a dialogue on the subject and have accepted uncritically the value-judgments of eighteenth-century scholarship. One approach to be used in this author's new book, *Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance*, compares the work of 782 Italian historians from earliest times through the seventeenth century. The humanist historiography of the Italian Renaissance exhibited the concepts of change, contingency, and epoch in history; relied on ancient forms; used methodological principles of causation; and taught moral and political lessons. Italian Baroque historiography, on the other hand, employed the forms of the new bulletins or avvisi, copied the prose style of its contemporaries, discounted its practical utility, and displayed a separation between history as literature and history as research.

SANDE COHEN, Structuralism and the Writing of Intellectual History

History is not the nature or foundation of knowledge, but is rather a language of cultural conventions concerning remembrances of the past. As a system of intellectual history, structuralism argues that historians do not consign meaning to texts of the past. The historians' practice, itself, introduces sense and logic into a past text before that text has meaning. Historical practice, then, presupposes culture. It can be understood by uncovering the linguistic rules which determine what structures and messages can count as historical knowledge. Ideas as different as those of Husserl and Wittgenstein, for example, share the common syntactical basis of philosophy. The primary question for history should not be "What did that mean?" but "How did that phenomenon qualify for a category called history and how has historical writing acquired discursive power?"

CHARLES COLLIER, History, Culture, and Communication

History, like language and other cultural "systems of signification," depends upon the transmission or communication of meaning in time. This implies that history is subject to a process of cultural selection more characteristic of language and that the true objects of historical research and inquiry must be understood as intended communications. The selection of particular elements for use in a cultural system is made on the basis of "place-values" which direct but do not determine the form of the culture. These are neither individual nor comprehensive decisions, but rather are general systems of actions, ideas, and beliefs. Nonetheless, a value has been placed on the elements themselves which indicates that, within the system, their significance is recognized and their preservation intended. There exists a link between fame and the culture's perception of its own influence and greatness over time.
JOHN P. DIGGINS, Animism and the Origins of
Alienation: The Anthropological Perspective
of Thorstein Veblen

Veblen used anthropological data as evidence to support and to
develop his economic theory. He adopted many of Marx's cate-
gories and assumptions to explain the problems of modern capitalist
society. Among them were class, alienation, and the essential benev-
olence of man. Unlike Marx, however, Veblen believed that man
has to comprehend before he can act. Man can also not tolerate
the disenchantment caused by a purely scientific and rational under-
standing of the world. Thus, man has a propensity to view the world
anthropomorphically, and this separates him from reality. In addi-
tion, the instinct toward workmanship which enables man to pro-
duce goods to improve his world, also generates new perceptions of
and desires for ownership and status. From his study of emulation
and comparison among primitive peoples, Veblen concluded that
alienation results from the forces of production rather than of con-
sumption.

W. H. DRAY, Concepts of Causation in A. J. P. Taylor's
Account of the Origins of the Second World War

generated substantial criticism from historians. However, Taylor and
his critics agree on many aspects of causality. At least four models
of the cause *versus* condition argument can be discerned in the work
of both Taylor and his critics. The first is the "traditional" theory
that the war was caused by a single man, Adolf Hitler. A second
issue concerns what it means to say that Hitler "intended" to take
certain actions. The third is to what extent conditions forced the
occurrence of particular events. The final conception of cause re-
vealed is the notion of a condition which is sufficient to effect a
result. Though Taylor seems to arrive at this position, he does not
offer any opinion on the sufficient conditions themselves.

JOHN C. ECKALBAR, The Saint-Simonian Philosophy of
History: A Note

The Saint-Simonians viewed man's history as a process of progres-
sive moral development which paralleled the growth of the human
body; political and social institutions served as the realization of
this moral order in the world. When these institutions were con-
sistent with men's moral state, then unity and harmony prevailed
and the period was referred to as an organic epoch. As men pro-
gressed, in accordance with the law of human perfectibility, morals became incompatible with existing institutions. This situation generated chaos and conflict and was called a critical epoch. The Saint-Simonians identified two occurrences of this process in history, and considered themselves the bearers of the third and final organic epoch. They shunned the competitive organization of laissez-faire capitalism and argued that moral, aesthetic, and industrial progress within the "Final State" would occur within a universal and hierarchically arranged social system.

**KARL-GEORG FABER, The Use of History in Political Debate**

XVII, Bei. 17, 36-67

During the nineteenth century, writers of the historicist school argued that though knowledge of the past cannot be directly applied to daily problems, it is nevertheless indispensable for a true understanding of the present. In practice, however, both politicians and historians used historical arguments to support political positions. This is illustrated by a study of the use of history in the political debates over the Polish question (1848), the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), and the Ostverträge (1972). These debates illustrate three uses of historical evidence in policy arguments. The forms include the projected success or failure of a particular decision, the moral and legal implications of that decision, and the symbolic values which the decision reflected. There is, however, a fundamental contradiction between history and politics. While history must methodologically suspend normative premises, political decisions are founded upon the notion of a right distribution of power.

**JAMES FARR, Hume, Hermeneutics, and History: A "Sympathetic" Account**

XVII, 285-310

Though Hume is often considered the hero of analytic philosophy in its positivistic phase, his concept of sympathy can be understood as an eighteenth-century prototype of *Verstehen*. Sympathy is central to Hume's moral philosophy, as he considered it the source of human motivation, social interaction, evaluation, and understanding. It has been acknowledged that sympathy, for Hume, was the human ability to associate with the sensations and passions of others. However, he also stated that this association was neither feeling nor passion, but a species of communication. This sympathetic communication included not only passions and feelings, but ideas, opinions, and reason. Though somewhat inconsistently, Hume argued that the process of sympathy was hermeneutic rather than causal. Like the concept of *Verstehen*, sympathy requires a contextual understanding of human relations.
Revisionists such as Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, and John Dunn argue that in order to understand an historical text, one must recover the particularity of intended meaning. According to this view, in the sphere of political/social reality, thought has no universal truth, no independence of its context, no significance for the present, and no meaning beyond the author's intentions. Although this is a variant of classic historicism, it goes far beyond the latter. A study of Gramsci's historicism shows that only the first of the above claims is entailed by historicism or justifiable in its own terms. The revisionist program would prevent us from understanding our own political ideas as they are founded upon our philosophical traditions.

Baruch Fischhoff, Intuitive Use of Formal Models: A Comment on Morrison's "Quantitative Models in History"

Morrison attempted to disprove Arthur Schlesinger's analysis that Roosevelt's decision to pack the Supreme Court in 1937 could only be understood in qualitative terms. Morrison argued, rather, that at least one aspect of Roosevelt's decision, the vacancy of seats on the Supreme Court, behaved in accordance with the Poisson statistical distribution. However, this argument assumes that the probabilistic process itself had both memory and morality. Moreover, it assumes that individuals possess an understanding of statistical methods. Formal quantitative methods are usually narrow and not easily generalized. Despite the difficulties with Morrison's particular argument, informal quantitative methods or "rules of thumb" are frequently used in the decision-making process. A cautious application of informal heuristics can prove a useful tool for historical research.

Michael Frisch, American Urban History as an Example of Recent Historiography

At its inception during the 1940s, American urban history displayed a tension between the traditional emphasis on American democratic ideals and the new scientific approach characteristic of the Chicago School. Some advances in this methodological conflict were made in the mid-1960s. Then, works such as Thernstrom's Poverty and Progress used a "bottom-up" approach to social history which was dependent upon evidence obtainable only from quantitative
scientific methods. The attraction of Thernstrom's model was its simplicity and its subject, social mobility, which encompassed a variety of classic American issues including the tension between freedom and equality. Despite these syncretic breakthroughs, American urban history remains steeped in the American historiographic tradition and suffers from the lack of a dialogue with Marxist scholarship. New research must be directed toward the development of categories adequate to explain its broad and complex subject-matter.

BALKRISHNA GOVIND GOKHALE, Nehru and History XVII, 311-322

Though an increased historical awareness was among the new ideas comprising Indian nationalism, not all leaders shared the same perception of that past. Nehru had no single system of thought but his historical writings show the influence of both Marxist and liberal humanism. He adopted much of the Marxist rhetoric and used concepts such as the polarity of opposing forces. Nehru was concerned not with the role of individuals in history, but with the daily lives, values, and tradition of civilizations. He also considered economics the primary causal factor in history. Yet, Nehru had been heavily influenced by Gandhi and could not subscribe to the violence implicit in the Marxist resolution of conflict. He held mixed views on capitalism. Nehru understood its potential benefit to human welfare, but he also believed that it generates a decline in the spirit of a civilization far more destructive than foreign attack.

LEON J. GOLDSTEIN, History and the Primacy of Knowing XVI, Bei. 16, 29-52

Knowledge, including historical knowledge, is dependent upon the procedure by which it is acquired. Nowell-Smith attempts to drive a logical wedge between the assertion of historical statements and the objects to which they refer. This distinction between assertion and referent, however, does not exist in the practice of history. In historical study there is no way to acquire knowledge except through the construction of theory. The brute sensory data which form an essential part of an understanding of the present are not available to historians. As far as the epistemology of history is concerned, the real past has no influence on historical knowledge. Though truth may be the object of the historical enterprise, it cannot be obtained except through theory, and is, therefore, inseparable from the infrastructure of that enterprise.
Hayden White intends his *Metahistory* to be a contribution to the current discussion of the problem of historical knowledge. In the debate between the positivist and idealist schools, White disclaims both the positivist prescriptions for history as a science, and the idealist perspective of history as an autonomous discipline. Rather, he argues that historians cannot tell the truth about the past because of the limitations inherent in the linguistic structure of texts. White concludes then that the writing of history is aesthetic and moral rather than cognitive. Philosophers such as Collingwood disagree with this perspective and argue that content disciplines and limits the narrative imagination. By abandoning the positivist requirement of universal explanatory laws, one can view human action as infinitely complex and subject perpetually to disagreement and revision. By abandoning the criterion of truth White has destroyed personal responsibility and ultimately freedom itself.

**Michael Goodich, A Note on Sainthood in the Hagiographical Prologue**

In the thirteenth century, the hagiographical prologue gave its authors an opportunity to reflect upon the theological implications of Catholic sainthood and to define the role of the saint in the divine scheme of salvation. The hagiographers were most frequently either monks or philosophers, and whereas the former would assume a humble stance, the latter would display their dialectical skill. Hagiographers used the opportunity of the prologue to answer critics and to criticize the learned disciplines, especially philosophy. The structure was usually two-part (life and miracles), with an occasional post-mortem. Though most were modeled after the traditional “florilegia,” some authors grappled with theological issues.

**Robert A. Gorman, Empirical Marxism**

“Empirical Marxism” comprises a number of Marxists from the nineteenth century to the present who have tried to formulate an alternative to the orthodox materialism and determinism which would be more open to verification through empirical science. This interest connects such otherwise diverse thinkers as the empiricists, Eduard Bernstein, the Austro-Marxists, Galvano Della Volpe, and Lucio Colletti. In different ways, all of these attempted but failed to resolve the tension between revolutionary theory based on a priori premises and empiricist methodology responsive to factual research.
DAVID, CYNTHIA, JOHN

History, more than other subjects, is confronted with the need to understand the nature of social time. Braudel, representing the objectivist approach, argued that there exists a universal objective world-time permeated by diverse tempi and rhythms. Althusser criticized this view by stating that each level (economic, political, and scientific) within society has its own set of temporal relations. However, Althusser’s argument requires not the rejection, but the further understanding of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In order for his concepts to have meaning, they must be based on the meaningful intersubjective relationships of the participants. There is a gap between the philosophical concept of subjective meaning and historical practice. Four phenomenological ideal types of time—synchronic, diachronic, specific, and eternal—can be used to replace objective history with a “history” of times.

CYNTHIA HAY, Historical Theory and Historical Confirmation XIX, 39-57

In his book *Our Knowledge of the Historical Past*, Murray Murphey argued that historians develop their own theories rather than rely on those of social science. Even the most empirical history uses constructed inferences when it identifies, explains, or interprets historical phenomena. Historical theories often invoke the covering-law model. Though historians are often unaware of their use of theory, their schemata are not different in kind from those of other disciplines. However, Murphey’s notion of historical covering laws cannot support the kinds of counterfactuals used in science. Moreover, since historians are not always explicit or rigorous about their use of theory, it is unlikely that such interpretations can fulfill the analytical criteria of the sciences. Finally, Murphey contradicts himself in his discussion of historical confirmation when he demonstrates the difficulty of establishing the empirical adequacy of historical theory.

DAVID L. HULL, In Defense of Presentism XVIII, 1-15

Historians must have an understanding of the present both to reconstruct the past and to explain that reconstruction to a contemporary audience. One criticism of presentism is that it is an interpretation of the past in terms of current values and ideas, and fails to provide a complete picture of the historical context. Regardless of such practices, however, the historian is limited to the methodological and archival tools available during his own time. Meaning, reason, and truth are different for different periods and peoples. The clarity of his language, the consistency of his logic, and the
validity of his proofs are relative to the historian's time and culture. The act of historical inquiry is influenced by the contrasts between past and present. Only by consciously addressing his dependence on the present can the historian adequately understand the past.

R. STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, The Historian, His Documents and the Elementary Modes of Historical Thought XIX, 1-20

A new characterization of historical thought which could prove adequate for both historians and philosophers begins with the raw materials of historical inquiry. The approach delineates what modes of thought historians apply to the artifacts which they consider evidence. History, here, is defined as the attempt to give veridical and logically adequate descriptions of change in human affairs. The term description, which refers to a verbal imitation of reality, raises several questions concerning the conceptual limitations, validity, and internal coherence of historical interpretation. There are two modes of historical description. The synchronic mode assumes a nonchanging structure of thought and behavior which is inferred from the text itself. The diachronic mode is an anachronistic form which assumes change and draws on modes of understanding from outside the text. From the latter we can define a model of reality.

B. C. HURST, A Comment on the Possible Worlds of Climo and Howells XVIII, 52-60

Climo and Howells argue that a comparison of counterfactual statements is the best approach to causation in historical analysis. In historical explanation, it is often difficult to distinguish causes from effects, real causes from potential ones, and epiphenomena from either causes or effects. The symbolic statement "A causes B" describes the actual world. Two statements using the parameters A and B may be formed which do not describe the actual world. By determining which of the statements, "If not-A then B" and "If not-A then not-B," is closer to the actual world, one can conclude whether A is a cause of B. Despite their claims, however, Climo and Howells do not prove that their method is superior to others in dealing with effects and preemption. Their method also has internal difficulties when dealing with epiphenomena and relations to the actual world.

B. C. HURST, The Myth of Historical Evidence XX, 278-290

Philosophers of history can be divided into two schools, the realist/empiricist and the instrumentalist/constructionist. Both accept that
the evidence of the past is given. The "myth of evidence," however, obscures the problematic character of description and prediction as essential activities of historians and archaeologists. To choose between competing claims about a particular event one does not choose between the individual descriptions. Rather, one chooses those narratives with the wider network of truth statements and predictive powers. Once the "myth of evidence" is dispelled, the philosophy of history should provide analyses and programs of data-description and prediction.

PATRICK H. HUTTON, The History of Mentalities  

XX, 237-259

The "history of mentalities" considers the attitudes of ordinary people to everyday life. The approach is closely identified with the work of the Annales school. However, whereas the Annales historians refer to the material factors which condition human life, historians investigating mentalities examine psychological underpinnings. Historians who first developed guidelines for the history of mentalities were Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, who were both concerned with collective systems of belief. Later, Philippe Ariès and Norbert Elias identified and developed theories on early childhood. Finally, Michel Foucault considered the psychology of social deviants and nonconformists. This mode of interpretation provides a means of examining those aspects of life which the linear approach cannot address, such as the pressure of conformity, the sense of accelerating time, and the preoccupation with self.

PHILIP J. KAIN, Marx's Dialectic Method  

XIX, 294-312

The current issue over Marx's Grundrisse and Capital is whether these works represent a unity with or a rupture from his earlier writings. A third interpretation is more adequate than either of these: the new "dialectic method" of the later works transforms elements of his earlier outlooks into a new synthesis. In earlier works Marx describes three processes: the historical generation of the concrete, the historical development of categories, and the methodological ordering of these categories. However, his views changed on which of these processes are primary. In the later works, the third process becomes independent; this modifies his view of the other two processes, and thereby of the relation of consciousness and laws of social development to material conditions.

PHILIP J. KAIN, Marx's Theory of Ideas  

XX, Bei. 20, 357-378

In The German Ideology (1845-1846), Marx developed his notion of "the materialist view of the world," which differed from both
the earlier 1844 Manuscripts and the later Grundrisse, Critique of Political Economy, and Capital. First, whereas Marx had distinguished human life from other forms of life as the result of an essence, Marx now argued that material conditions determine the human condition. Second, ideas can affect human life but they are themselves the product of material conditions. Third, though he later reverses himself, he rejects not only the identification but the value of abstractions and categories. Fourth, Marx no longer considers man's history to be a radical self-creation through labor, but a natural self-consciousness modified by productive and social intercourse. Finally, Marx inverted his theory of language and now considered it the product rather than the source of material conditions.

**HANS KELLNER, A Bedrock of Order:**
Hayden White's Linguistic Humanism XIX, Bei. 19, 1-29

In Metahistory, White establishes a self-contained system of historical criticism which uses the nineteenth-century historical tradition as its direction and current cultural politics as its strategy. He argues that the flow of human events over time results from an interaction between the rules of tradition and the human mastery of that tradition through free will. After the spirit of Vico and Nietzsche, White considers the historical text a narrative representation which subsumes the logic of explanation. Rather than psychology and sociology, White chooses the trope as the basis of his linguistic system. Within his four-trope system, White identifies his own position as that of the ironic trope. Given tropology as the irreducible element, the four levels themselves become tropological. Metahistory is Metaphoric as it reaffirms human freedom through the creative use of language and Ironic because the rules of discourse place such affirmation "under erasure."

**HANS KELLNER, Disorderly Conduct: Braudel's Mediterranean Satire [A Review of Reviews] XVIII, 197-222**

Braudel's Le Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II (1949) has been hailed as a classic of twentieth-century scholarship and criticized as "an exhausting treadmill," without coherence, unity, or form. However, Braudel has used a form, that of the Menippean satire, which, though troublesome, is the work's innovation. One characteristic of the genre is its contrast of verse and prose. Braudel altered this by considering verse and prose together and opposing them to quantification. A second characteristic is that the form satirizes abstract ideas and attitudes. Finally, the mode uses facts in an encyclopedic way, thus tending to give the
piece a stuffed and saturated quality. The purpose of Braudel's form, from a structuralist's standpoint, is to write a history which will not overemphasize particular events, as does the traditional narrative style.

ADRIAN KUZMINSKI, Defending Historical Realism XVIII, 316-349

Formerly, history was considered a discipline which attempts to arrive at a description of how the past really was. The truth of historical arguments could then be verified by evidence. This Rankean notion of historical realism is currently rejected by many historians because the evidence upon which it depends is itself theory-bound. This critical or "ironic" perspective, however, like the realist descriptions it criticizes, cannot provide a single method of accounting for events. The structuralist theory developed by Hayden White attempts to resolve this conflict by taking as its object not experience, but men's various representations of experience. However, to claim that truth depends upon criteria outside of the evidence renders the historian subject to either relativism or dogmatism. Only through a nontheoretical faith in the power of evidence to prove can historical inquiry uncover the true past.

DOMINICK LACAPRA, Habermas and the Grounding of Critical Theory XVI, 237-264

The introduction and appendices to Habermas's texts reveal, both explicitly and implicitly, some inner contestations within his social theory. Habermas attempts to ground critical theory in a philosophical anthropology based upon quasi-transcendental cognitive interests and an ideal speech situation involving a consensus theory of truth. Unlike other expositors of dialectical theory, Habermas fails to address systematically the notion of supplementarity. Thus the dichotomous typologies of his analysis appear frozen within the existing ideological framework and some are in conflict with the emancipatory aspect of his theory. Habermas must clarify the overlapping character of his categories and recognize the logic of harmony implicit within his analyses in order to make his theory compatible with his criticism.

DOMINICK LACAPRA, Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts XIX, 245-276

Historiography has been dominated by a documentary approach to the reconstruction of the past. For intellectual historians the
result has been the treatment of the historical text as a description rather than a dialogue. Though such interpretations recognize the context, they do so in a reductive fashion. This, in effect, restricts the historiography to an ideal type, a heuristic fiction, or a self-conscious defense of the historians' craft. The alternative to the documentary approach, however, is not a view of history as a projection on the present. Such views themselves are dependent upon the reductive tendencies of the documentary approach and become subject to the same criticisms. What is required is a more performative approach which addresses the complex interaction between the language of the text and that of the context.

MAURICE MANDELBAUM, The Presuppositions of

*Metahistory*  
XIX, Bei. 19, 39-54

Within his metahistorical thesis, White makes three assumptions about the nature of historical writing. First, he argues that “histories proper” and “philosophies of history” differ in emphasis and not in content because both share a common narrative strategy. However, White fails to acknowledge the vast differences in scope, principles of interpretation, and meaning between the two disciplines. Second, White assumes that the activity of ordering the historical text is a poetic act. This approach ignores the fact that events and the relationships of those events exist prior to and independent of the historical account. Moreover, his tropological structures are too inflexible to provide a useful understanding of historical discourse. Finally, he never questions the validity of viewing an historical work as a purely linguistic structure. In fact, whereas “histories proper” seem to have much in common to compare and to evaluate, “philosophies of history” almost never agree.

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH, Colligation and Classification in *History*  
XVII, 267-284

W. H. Walsh argued that historians used colligatory terms to describe historical change, and defined such terms as those which relate a group of events by a common idea or value. The colligatory term identifies a general relationship among singular events. Events give concrete expression to the ideas shared by the people who initiated them. Thus, colligatory terms, such as “French Revolution,” are always singular proper nouns, rather than general classifications. However, in addition to common ideas, colligatory terms are used to describe the form of the historical change. Terms like “revolution” and “renaissance” do convey meaning when applied generally. Colligatory terms, then, can relate formal structures as well as dispositional attitudes, and can function both as general classifications and as singular entities.
DONALD MCINTOSH, The Objective Bases of Max Weber's Ideal Types XVI, 265-279

Weber's methodological writings reveal an epistemological tension between an interpretative and a scientific conception of knowledge. He argues that social action has to be understood in terms of its subjective meaning for individuals, and that this action is not necessarily consistent or logical. On the other hand, however, this action can only be scientifically studied through the use of categories and models based on logic. In theory, this creates a tension between his concepts of the "method of understanding" and of "adequacy at the level of meaning." In practice, Weber resolves this methodological conflict. As he uses them, the categories of value and of knowledge derive from and reflect a universal structure of noological substratum of human thought. The thoughts and ideas of both social actor and social scientist are formed from a single objective basis.

ALLAN MEGILL, Aesthetic Theory and Historical Consciousness in the Eighteenth Century XVII, 29-62

Eighteenth-century historiography was not, as Meinecke argued, "the substitution of a process of individualizing observation for a generalizing view of human forces in history." This generally accepted view involves a metaphysics which, though characteristic of nineteenth-century historicism, rejects the primarily contextual evaluation of eighteenth-century historicism. This underlying form of evaluation developed not with individualism, but with aesthetics. Though usually considered a product of the eighteenth century, aesthetic historicism can be traced to the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, which began in the late 1680s and culminated with the "war over Homer" of 1714-1716. This argument explored the problem of evaluating the art of other historical ages. The implications of this position are that historicism was not an essentially German movement and that historicism was not a rigid antithesis to the Enlightenment.

JOHN D. MILLIGAN, The Treatment of an Historical Source XVIII, 177-196

When faced with a primary source which seems to refute received historical knowledge, what should the historian's response be? The first step is to determine the truth of the statement. The source must
be examined for its authenticity, date, and place of inception. It is also necessary to examine whether the witness meant what he literally said, whether he was physically and mentally capable of telling the truth, and whether he had any motivation to lie. In the case of a letter by Charles Ellet accusing Grant, Porter, and Sherman of treason, the testimony loses its credibility when the circumstances of Ellet himself were inspected. But validity is only one use of an historical source. For example, Ellet's story reveals the intraservice rivalry present during the Civil War. What answers an historical document provides depends upon the questions asked.

ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO, Greek Historiography

During the modern period, thinkers have asked two fundamental questions about Greek historiography. The first concerns the compatibility of Greek historiography with the Biblical vision of the world, and the second compares the Greek vision with modern historiographical views. The status of history was never clearly settled among the Greeks, though it never replaced or was accepted by Greek philosophy and religion. Greek historiography progressed from an essentially local, ethnographic, and mythological practice, to the more national concerns of war and politics. Greek history was not incompatible with Christian ethics. However, because human destiny was not its object, the Christian and modern moral questions about truth and value were not rigorously explored. In addition, the modern demands for proof and validity in the use of evidence were not fulfilled.

ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO, A Note on Max Weber's Definition of Judaism as a Pariah-Religion

Max Weber introduced the term "pariah" into the scientific study of Judaism and defined it as the voluntary religious and moral segregation of a people from their host culture. However, problems arise with his explanation. First, Weber defines "guest people" as a group lacking an autonomous political organization but fails to explain why this occurred. Second, he suggests an "ethic of resentment" between those in a "pariah" status and others, but fails to provide evidence that such an attitude existed for the early Jews. Third, he obscures the description of when and where Jews became "pariahs." It seems that Weber misinterpreted the religious segregation dictated by the Talmud with actual legal separation effected by the particular society in which Jews resided. The juridical pact between God and the Jewish nation led to self-regulation rather than the self-abasement characteristic of pariah nations.
The contribution of historical judgment to a rational world view can be understood only if it is assumed that the conceptual tools of an historian are, at least in part, culturally determined. The historian's cultural tools include his social self-image, and notions of past change and future development. Both the typological and the narrative forms of historical explanation are, in Hempel's terms, partial explanations which emphasize only selected causal relationships. Though these explanations do not meet Popper's and Nagel's standards of verification because they cannot be proven false, they can be verified intersubjectively. The extent and the integration of source material as well as the logical consistency of an explanation can be tested. Through a rational criticism of the assumptions underlying historical explanation, a society can also critically examine its assumptions about the present.

Quantitative methods are not only useful but sometimes crucial to historical analysis. They can, for example, demonstrate that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. is wrong in his conclusion that Roosevelt had no choice but to fill the federal courts with his supporters in 1937 and thus to incur public wrath. The Supreme Court had ruled consistently that programs of the New Deal were unconstitutional. To that point in his presidency, Roosevelt had had no opportunity to appoint new members to the Supreme Court and Schlesinger argues that he saw no prospect of any in the future. On the contrary, statistical analysis shows that Roosevelt had a great probability of making future appointments. Even if he had acted only on the basis of informal information, Roosevelt, a man predisposed to risk, would have seen the favorable odds.

Mannheim held a paradoxical position when he acknowledged that since all ideologies are false, yet all systems of social, political, and historical thought are ideologies, it followed that his own sociological perspectives were false. To escape from the implications of this relativistic position, he stated that historical perspectives must be
viewed as part of a dynamic world. Though there exists an objective historical reality, historical knowledge is relative to the social circumstances of a particular time. However, Mannheim's theory rests on two assumptions which state that social-historical thought is determined by group economic and political interests and that there is a reality distinct from what language describes. However, by rejecting Mannheim's view and considering language an essential component of reality, ideology is freed from questions of objective validity and made available for rational inquiry.

JOHN S. NELSON, Tropal History and the Social Sciences: Reflections on Struever's Remarks XIX, Bei. 19, 80-101

Struever argues ("Topics in History," Beiheft 19, 66-79) that White's emphasis on language, use of tropology, and adherence to formalism render his theory ahistorical. However, like White, she fails to define either her terms or her rationale for contrasting tropological with topological rhetoric, fails to take responsibility for our times, and fails to delineate clearly her views on the dynamics of history. What is required is further research and elaboration of White's tropal philosophy. A program for this study includes the clarification of a rhetoric for inquiry, of tropes, and of elective affinity. These concepts should then be applied systematically to the disciplines of social science and to philosophy of history. White's concept of irony must also be isolated, sorted, and examined for its resistance to isolation and sorting. Finally, one must address the principles of politics which underlie these concepts, this text, and ultimately texts in general.

MARGIT HURUP NIELSEN, Re-enactment and Reconstruction in Collingwood's Philosophy of History XX, 1-31

Collingwood's re-enactment doctrine, the notion that the historian must re-enact the past in his own mind, forms the methodological pillar of Collingwood's constructivism. The first tenet of this interpretation states that for the past to be knowable it must have left traces analyzable in the present. Second, the historical process must be rational, which necessitates that the object of knowledge be "re-enactable" and that the subject of knowledge (the historian) be "re-enact-capable." Third, both subject and object must come in contact in an actual act of knowing. Finally, criticism and justification of this reconstruction must constantly take place in order to assure that this reconstruction is actual. This interpretation was developed by Collingwood over several of his works. Our understanding of it is clarified by a study of his unpublished manuscripts, which have only recently been made accessible.
The constructionist thesis of history states, in general, that the historian must construct a theory to explain the past. Some, including Leon Goldstein, attempt to push this formulation beyond a description of historical methodology. They argue that since the real past is inaccessible to present observation, the real past can have no relevance for historiography. The distinctions made between the present, the real past, and the historical past generate problems with the concepts of past and present knowledge, theoretical infrastructure and experience, verification and truth, conflicting historical theories, and observation and knowledge. Goldstein’s formulation of the constructionist thesis assumes the conflicting positions that experiential perception is paradigmatic of all methods of acquiring knowledge, and that knowledge is itself a kind of experience. As well as conflicting with commonsense views, his thesis is internally incoherent.

The Verstehen thesis is Weber’s method for identifying and understanding sociocultural phenomena. He assumes that, as the study of meaningful human conduct, the social sciences (unlike the natural sciences), must recognize that the actor who participates in cultural activities has already defined those actions. Only actions which have meaning for the agent can count as sociocultural phenomena. Weber’s exposition of the Verstehen thesis is scattered among many of his essays and criticisms in the form of illustrations and examples, consistent with his belief that sociocultural investigation requires flexible programs rather than a permanent conceptual scheme. He observed that the Methodenstreit of his day created a crisis of the social sciences because of the excessive emphasis on methodological issues, and he proposed the Verstehen thesis as a solution to this early twentieth-century crisis.

The importance of moral judgment in history has been contested by many historians, including Herbert Butterfield, George Kitson Clark, and E. H. Carr. Butterfield describes moral judgments as outside the historian’s realm, imposing limitations on imaginative endeavor, and irrelevant. Clark states that such assessments may be made but by nonhistorians. Carr argues that moral judgment must
be made about society and not about private individuals. All of these opinions are incorrect because the authors have failed to define precisely how moral judgment is categorically different from other kinds of historical judgment. The historian's moral interpretation may aid the novice in understanding the past without limiting the more advanced reader. Moreover, the historian has a responsibility to educate which cannot be limited to nonmoral issues.

CARL E. PLETSCH, History and Friedrich Nietzsche's Philosophy of Time XVI, 30-39

Though Nietzsche never developed a theory of history, his comments on time yield a radical approach to historical interpretation. Central to this philosophy is the concept of eternal recurrence. Time, with neither boundary nor purpose, returns from the past to repeat itself in its same form. This generates a psychological and moral problem for men, as it fails to provide the elements of meaning which Nietzsche considered essential to the human psyche. Men survive the aimlessness of history by living in the unhistorical consciousness of the immediate present. Nietzsche's ideal is the supra-historical man, whose awareness of history, and his disgust with it, lead him to find meaning in the structure of time—a structure of meaninglessness. The value system of history is this will to power and precludes the extension of historical judgment to situations beyond the sphere of inquiry.

PHILIP POMPER, Typologies and Cycles in Intellectual History XIX, Bei. 19, 30-38

Hayden White, in *Metahistory*, rejects the psychological basis of language and, rather, emphasizes its formal characteristics. However, White assumes the existence of psychological phenomena such as “levels of consciousness” and imagination, which effectively undermines his synthetic principle. Another problem in White's theory is that he only describes the four phases of transition in public moods. His theory, then, suffers from the lack of a dynamic principle of change. In addition, his concept of “dialogical tension” appears a “catch-all” device for dealing with inconsistencies rather than a comprehensive analytical tool. The four typologies themselves assume a deep structure which provides heuristic value at the price of causal explanation. Finally, White attempts to use the trope of Irony as a dynamic principle. However, Irony has no formal restrictions and seems itself founded on disagreement rather than ultimate generative principles. His analysis would have been more convincing if it were limited to a description of literary subcultures rather than assuming theoretical coherence.
The predominant scholarly opinion argues that, for the ancients, the idea of history held no meaning because time was regarded as a circular pattern in which events are repeated. Only human thought and art were meaningful. This opinion, however, is based on an a priori definition of history as the whole temporal process. If the term "history" is examined from the standpoint of its use during antiquity, the analyses of the notions of time and history change. Rather than being regarded as circular and repetitious, time had no pattern at all. Though this concept posed some philosophical problems for ancient thinkers, including Aristotle, time was not discussed as a medium of history. The interest in history as an academic discipline and its view as a linear process with an origin and an end independent of human thought occurred only with the gradual and rhetorical transition to Judaeo-Christian belief.

JOHN PAUL RIQUELME, The *Eighteenth Brumaire* of Karl Marx as Symbolic Action  
XIX, 58-72

In the *Eighteenth Brumaire*, Marx used the concept of repetition as an interpretation of both historical events and historical narrative. The repetition of actual and symbolic actions also involves a transformation of those events into their opposites. Just as Louis Bonaparte was the farcical reversal of the tragic Napoleon I, Marx was the theoretical inversion of Hegel. This notion of repetition and reversal was the concept of revolution. Marx was self-conscious of his dual role as antagonist to Louis Bonaparte and as author who brought events and their meaning to conceptual consciousness and transformation. Marx resolved the antithetical drama of tragedy and farce by ironically merging uncle and nephew into one. Marx's historical text, then, brought about a mental revolution by implicitly offering an alternative to the destruction of the previous comedies.

MICHAEL S. ROTH, Foucault's "History of the Present"  
XX, 32-46

In *The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things*, and *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault writes a "history of the present" by showing the connections between the archaeology of knowledge and criticism. In the first, he is fundamentally concerned with the changes in human perception evident at the end of the eighteenth century and the relation of these changes to the fundamental structures of experience. Underlying the history of medicine is the moral and political attempt to link the development of science with the development of bourgeois freedom. In *The Order of Things*, he cites archaeology as a method of uncovering the fundamental paradigms
of cultures and their systems of thought. Finally, in *Discipline and Punish*, he considers discourse a domain of power relations and thus establishes a link between knowledge and power. A “history of the present” is a self-conscious field of power relations and political struggle.

**THEODOR SCHIEDER**, The Role of Historical Consciousness in Political Action XVII, Bei. 17, 1-18

Historical consciousness refers not only to a knowledge of the past but implies the use of that knowledge to understand the future. Many elements blur our perception of history as it regards current political action. It may cripple us with the realization of the relative inability of individuals to effect change. In addition, our memories of the past tend to be selective and short. We may remember falsity rather than truth. History, itself, may be used as evidence in the support of particular political positions merely for the benefit of a single group. Nonetheless, all of us are affected to some extent by the understanding of our historical traditions and in its best form this knowledge leads us from legend toward truth. The current trend to ignore historical education could prevent us from learning that the truth of the past forms the core of our knowledge of the future.

**AUGUST LUDWIG SCHLÖZER**, On Historiography [1783] [Classics in the Philosophy of History Series] XVIII, 41-51

In 1783, during the height of the German Enlightenment, August Ludwig Schlözer published this essay on history as an autonomous critical science. Schlözer had helped to establish history as an independent academic discipline at Göttingen University. His essay outlines four criteria for criticizing historical work. Such pieces should be true, complete, broad in scope, and well written. Though the Greeks were fine painters of history, their accounts could not match the first three of these ideals. The most thorough history would probably require separate individuals to undertake the collection, verification, and editing of usable information. Only then could the results be written by a “historical painter.” Schlözer undertook all of these tasks himself in his five-volume work on ancient Russia, entitled *Nestor*.

**JEAN SEZNEC**, Michelet in Germany: A Journey in Self-Discovery XVI, 1-10

Michelet’s historical writings blend the romantic characteristics of the erotic, the funereal, and the demoniac. These writings formed
the artistic expression of a personality obsessed with the erotic fantasies of death—particularly the death of women. Michelet believed that he was beckoned by the dead to resurrect their existence and to understand them better than they had understood themselves. He endeavored to identify himself with the dead in order to relive, rather than simply to collect, their experiences. Though called to his art, he feared its tendency to isolate him from nature, from common men, and from himself. He began to resolve this conflict in 1842 at the shrine of St. Sebald in Nuremburg, where he meditated upon Peter Vischer's self-portrait depicting the artist as a laborer. Michelet found harmony between his artistic nature and the world of common men by understanding history, his art, as his toil.

WILLIAM H. SHAW, "The Handmill Gives You the Feudal Lord": Marx's Technological Determinism XVIII, 156-176

Many contemporary Marxist scholars consider technological determinism a "vulgar" interpretation of Marx's theory of history. They argue that though Marx may have made such statements, they were inconsistent with many other aspects of his paradigm. However, a more fundamental analysis illustrates that the themes contained in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy pervade Marx's scholarship and letters. Though the term technology may be a misnomer, Marx believed that productive forces form the material basis of society and determine its economic, political, and religious structures. He did not argue that the superstructure has no effect on social relations, but considered these secondary to economic factors. Regardless of the empirical validity of his historical predictions, his theory derives its value from its role as a coherent research program which promotes new hypotheses and empirical discoveries.

ROBERT SOUTHARD, Theology in Droysen's Early Political Historiography: Free Will, Necessity, and the Historian XVIII, 378-396

During the revolutionary mid-nineteenth century in Germany and Prussia, Droysen advocated political change from the standpoint of a neo-Hegelian scholar. He justified his commitment to both political partisanship and historical scholarship through the use of a theological conceptual base. Droysen believed that free will and necessity exist as interdependent forces in the world. Whereas God's divine purpose can only be realized through acts of free will, such acts occur when necessary. Christian faith and historical understanding ensure free will. History is not a conservative force as it has the
right to create and to destroy. Droysen favored the rise of the modern state and argued that the modern drive for power would eventually lead to political freedom. Through unity and participation, the state enables individuals to realize their moral potential.

NANCY STRUEVER, Topics in History XIX, Bei. 19, 66-79

In *Metahistory*, Hayden White chose literary style as that form of rhetoric with which he could better understand the relationship between what historians say and how they say it. By limiting his use of rhetoric to a theory of tropics, White has reduced rhetoric to poetics and rendered his construct antihistorical. Alternatively, one should consider history as both discipline and argument and by extension use a topics rather than a tropics of historical discourse. The rules which govern the narrative argument of history more closely resemble those of law rather than those of literature. Within the discipline of classical rhetoric, it is the lines (topoi) or places (loci) of argument which determine its conviction. Unlike White's poetical use of rhetoric, a topical approach can distinguish between sophisticated and naive argument, can illumine the complex relationship between history and genre, and can evaluate political discourse.

JERZY TOPOLSKI, Conditions of Truth of Historical Narratives XX, 47-60

The classical conception of truth requires modification in order to apply to historical narratives. Historians do not simply discover the past but constitute certain facts about it. The logic of historical narratives is distinctive in three ways. First, the truth of component statements does not guarantee the truth of the whole. Second, narrative may be true as a whole even though some of its statements are false. Finally, a greater proportion of true statements in one narrative does not necessarily make it truer than another. The "vertical" structure of the historical narrative consists of the articulated surface stratum, the implicit surface stratum, and the deep (latent or theoretical) stratum. The truth of a narrative is primarily determined by the third of these.

W. J. VAN DER DUSSEN, Collingwood's Unpublished Manuscripts XVIII, 287-315

Collingwood said that mind is always in development, and his now accessible unpublished manuscripts exemplify that statement. Prior to 1926, he held a realistic philosophy of history which regarded knowledge of the past as being based on concrete fact. By 1926,
however, he began to reveal a Kantian influence by considering philosophy a universal and transcendental body of concepts which arise when anyone thinks about a subject. History is, then, transcendental as well as empirical. Collingwood then argued that only the present is real, and thus history can only be an ideal reconstruction of the past. He continued to explore until his death the implications of this last notion in studies of the relationship between philosophy and history and the problem of historical interpretation. He also made elaborate studies of folklore, anthropology, and cosmology. Appendix: a descriptive list of the Collingwood mss. in the Bodleian Library.

IRMLINE VEIT-BRAUSE, A Note on Begriffsgeschichte XX, 61-67

In recent years, the focus of historical research has shifted from events to the substructures of large-scale processes. Begriffsgeschichte, represented by the multi-volume Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, is an analysis of the concepts accompanying such processes and interpretations of them. It is problematic whether such concepts offer adequate historical interpretations or prejudge the analysis. Begriffsgeschichte incorporates history of ideas, historical semantics, and sociology of knowledge; it selects the relevant terms and methods of interpretation for the new social history of ideas. The attempt is to define cultural transition on the basis of changes in language. Specifically examined are changes in the types of communications and in the relative usage of those communications. Begriffsgeschichte describes three kinds of linguistic response to new experiences: the adaptation of traditional meanings, conceptual innovation, and the extension of new meanings to old realities.

RICHARD VERNON, Auguste Comte and "Development": A Note XVII, 323-326

Comte is best known for his law of three states. According to this law, history necessarily develops through three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific. However, the notion of "development" takes on three meanings within his works. First, he describes it as the unfolding of an inherent principle of growth analogous to the individual life process. Second, development is a causal sequence for organic growth. The individual's life is not the fulfillment of an immanent purpose but is the outcome of past achievements. Finally, Comte considered change a progressive elaboration through a variety of environments. Though history had an end, events are not a contingent sequence of steps toward that end, but are rather anticipations of it. Comte's paradigms of the process of secularization demonstrate the importance of these distinctions.
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LAWRENCE D. WALKER, A Note on Historical Linguistics and Marc Bloch's Comparative Method XIX, 154-164

Bloch speculated that the future of history might depend upon the comparative method. Whereas the "romantic" method sought the origins of a subject, Bloch's method began with the most recent model. Bloch adopted the comparative method of linguistics. Sewell has identified different levels of comparison in Bloch's work. The most rudimentary is the comparison of evidence from different sources. A second level compares situations in which there is a single outcome variable. A third, "higher" level requires the construction of a criterion model and its comparison with other areas of historical experience. The most fruitful aspect of Bloch's model is that it highlights differences. This demonstrates not only the change of institutions, but their inherent complexities and potentialities. The purpose of Bloch's method was to provide an increased understanding of what he considered the subject matter of science, "men in time."

W. H. WALSH, Truth and Fact in History Reconsidered XVI, Bei. 16, 53-71

Goldstein attempts to establish a middle position between the idealist and the realist arguments concerning truth and fact in history. Though fact serves as the touchstone of truth, we cannot verify propositions, especially historical propositions, in terms of fact. Nowell-Smith argues that Goldstein cannot acknowledge the importance of reality for everyday affairs, while denying its importance in history. Goldstein could have avoided such problems by realizing that if he is an opponent of historical realism, he must be a supporter of historical idealism. He could resolve Nowell-Smith's objections by adopting the Kantian argument which contrasts two types of judgment; judgment proper and particular attempts at judgment. Statements of objective fact, including historical facts, would be considered judgment proper. This would still allow for some judgments which did not fulfill objective criteria, but could count as knowledge.

LEON WIESELTIER, Etwas über die judische Historik: Leopold Zunz and the Inception of Modern Jewish Historiography XX, 135-149

With the publication of Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur (1818), Leopold Zunz argued that Jewish history should be studied by historians and that Jews should adopt history as a way of life. He
believed that the role of philology is to present every people with the entire mental development of its culture. Zunz adopted Boeckh's philological categories and proposed that Jewish texts be examined under the ideal of historical and grammatical criticisms. This method ran counter to the traditional evaluation of Jewish texts according to their normative and religious import. Zunz's work exhibits an almost apologetic overtone which implies that Jews were responsible for understanding their own history. This emphasis extended beyond the politics of culture to actual politics. In 1822, a Prussian edict barred Jews, including Zunz, from all civil and academic employment. His quest to establish an identity for Jews in the modern world ended in disillusionment with a culture he loved but could not live by.

**ADRIAN WILSON, The Infancy of the History of Childhood: An Appraisal of Philippe Ariès**

Philippe Ariès's book, *Centuries of Childhood*, has been hailed for over a decade as a leading work on family history. Ariès compared traditional and modern families and argued that *mignonage* (coddling) and the teaching of reason during childhood developed only during the modern period. Despite its popularity, the book is severely flawed. First, Ariès uses printed and pictorial art forms as evidence for the sentiments of the period. Second, he does not develop his explanations. Though he remarks about the absence of modern sentiment in traditional families, he does not articulate what the traditional sentiment was. Third, *Childhood* displays an ambiguous chronology which places the same historical point (the seventeenth century) at different temporal positions (early, middle, and late) within the narrative. Finally, Ariès consciously writes from a present-minded standpoint which limits his own understanding of the material.

**WILHELM WINDELBAND, History and Natural Science**

(Windelband's Rectorial Address at Strasbourg [1894]); with an Introductory Note by Guy Oakes [Classics in the Philosophy of History Series]

Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) transformed the conception of the history of philosophy from a purely chronological narrative of a specific philosopher to an inquiry into philosophical problems. The collapse of Hegelianism in the mid-nineteenth century was followed by the positivistic view which limited philosophy to problems of logic and epistemology. Such problems were held, in turn,
to be resolvable by empirical science. Windelband lashed out at this attitude in his rectorial address at Strasbourg. There, he first set out his distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methods. He argued that truth is a value to which necessity and universality must be ascribed. Just as Kant had considered the natural sciences the legitimate object of philosophical critique, so Windelband conceived the historical sciences. His lecture outlined the problematic later developed by Dilthey and Weber.
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